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 1. Introduction: Normative, Soft, Civilian, or Simply Weak Power? 
The EU’s Foreign Policy Identity 
 
For decades, debates about European foreign policy more or less focused on the ques-
tion whether there was such a thing as a “European foreign policy”, i.e., the emphasis 
was on the actorness of the European Union (EU) in foreign policy matters. Christopher 
Hill’s famous argument about the “capability-expectations gap” concerned such actor-
ness (Hill 1993). Today, things have gradually started changing, in parallel to the con-
tinuing institutionalization of CFSP/ESDP matters. For the past few years, the scholarly 
debate largely focused on the question “what characterizes this European foreign pol-
icy” (Sjursen 2006b: 169). Various concepts are floating around in the discourse: “Ve-
nus” (Kagan 2003); “normative power Europe” (Manners 2002; Scheipers/Sicurelli 
2007); “postmodern state” (Cooper 2000); “civilian power” (Duchêne 1972).  
These conceptualizations – for all their differences and their analytical weaknesses 
(see below) – share two features: First, they recognize that the EU indeed has a dis-
tinctive foreign policy by now and that, thus, the EU has emerged as an international 
actor. Even if – as (neo-) realists such as Robert Kagan or Adrian Hyde-Price do (Ka-
gan 2003; Hyde-Price 2006) – one explains the specific features of this foreign policy 
with its lack of (military) capabilities and with its intergovernmental decision-making 
process, the actorness of the EU in world affairs is no longer in doubt. This in itself is a 
significant development in the scholarly reflection of European foreign policy which 
should not be overlooked. 
Second, the four concepts mentioned above engage in identity discourse, whether ex-
plicitly or implicitly. As Thomas Diez points out, “the discourse of the EU as a normative 
power [or civilian power, for that matter/ TAB/T.R.] constructs a particular self of the 
EU” (Diez 2005: 614). Identity discourse, however, has its own problems, since it easily 
overlooks the difference between descriptive-analytical and normative statements. Ian 
Manners’ recent statements are interesting in this context: Only few years after he had 
coined the term “normative power,” he complains that the so-called “militarization” of 
the EU means that it is abandoning an identity that he himself has helped constructing 
(Manners 2006). Moreover, identity talk inevitably relies on distinctions between “self” 
and “other” which take on different forms (see again Diez 2005: 628f). In the case of 
the EU, its “normative power” identity is often contrasted to the United States (U.S.) 
which overlooks the fact that the U.S. has arguably been one of the biggest norm pro-
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 moters in the international system for decades (cf. Scheipers/Sicurelli 2007). Hege-
monic and other great powers tend to build the international (or the regional) system 
according to their own principles, norms, and rules. Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, 
the U.S., and now the EU have all been “normative powers” in the sense of their at-
tempts and capacities “to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations” 
(Manners 2002: 239; see also Diez 2005, on this point). Fortunately, Nazi Germany 
and the Soviet Union utterly failed in their attempts, while the U.S. post-World War II 
attempts have been rather successful, particularly with regard to the international eco-
nomic order. In other words, it makes little sense to ascribe a normative quality to a 
great power’s foreign policy identity as long as we do not specify which norms are be-
ing promoted. 
Last not least, describing a particular foreign policy identity should not be conflated with 
explaining it. A (neo-) realist account of the EU’s civilian or normative power is an at-
tempt at explanation (see Hyde-Price 2006). So is a sociological institutionalist attempt 
which uses the concept of institutional isomorphism to explain the EU’s policies toward 
the Mediterranean (Bicchi 2006a). One could add another institutionalist story empha-
sizing the EU’s peculiar cross-pillarized decision-making structure in foreign policy mix-
ing supranational and intergovernmental elements to explain why it primarily uses “soft 
power” instruments. 
This paper does not engage in explanation. Rather, we ask whether the EU’s efforts at 
the promotion of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, on the one hand, and 
the ESDP’s increasing role in peacekeeping and post-conflict state-building operations, 
on the other hand, are actually consistent with these role identities. For reasons ex-
plained below, we stick to the older concept of “civilian power” rather than the newer 
“normative power”, since the former focuses more on the means by which certain 
norms are promoted. We argue that, yes, the EU’s democracy promotion, peace-
keeping, and state-building policies have developed into a fairly consistent and com-
prehensive approach of an emerging civilian power. These policies are also implement-
ing the EU’s self-description in foreign and security affairs, the “European Security 
Strategy” (ESS, see European Council 2003), in a rather coherent way. This is surpris-
ing, for two reasons. First, the EU has developed these policies in a very incremental 
way and through a “trial and error” process whereby methods and instruments were 
often transferred from one policy area to another. Second, the EU is not a state. Its 
foreign policy apparatus still pales compared to the member states and its decision-
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 making process in foreign affairs is not only intergovernmental, but also opaque and 
sometimes even chaotic given its cross-pillarized nature. Nevertheless, the EU has 
developed into a truly civilian world power, which disposes of the entire spectrum of 
policy instruments necessary to effectively promote the “civilization” of international 
relations. 
Note that this paper is confined to analyzing the policies as revealed in the various 
documents. We ask whether the EU actually tries to implement what it professes to do, 
namely to promote democracy, human rights, the rule of law, “effective multilateralism,” 
and to contribute to peace and stability-building.1 We are not concerned here with the 
effectiveness of these efforts on the ground. We are fully aware of the literature that 
points to difficulties and outright policy failures (see e.g. the constantly updated contri-
butions in “CFSP Forum” provided by FORNET).  
We proceed in the following steps. First, we define what we mean by “civilian power” 
and develop criteria for its evaluation. Second, we review the EU policies for promotion 
of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Third, we look at the various ESDP 
missions for peace-, stability- and state-building as a hard case for the EU’s identity as 
a civilian power. Unlike often argued in the literature, we contend that the EU is only 
recently emerging as a civilian world power, precisely because it only now disposes of 
the entire spectrum of policy instruments necessary to effectively promote the “civiliza-
tion” of international relations. The paper concludes with some general observations on 
the suitability of the concept of “civilian power.” 
 
 
2. How Do We Know a Civilian Power When We See One? 
 
For various reasons, we prefer the concept of “civilian power” over its competitors, in 
particular in comparison to the concept of “normative power.” While the latter has 
sparked quite a debate in recent years (see particularly the March 2006 issue of the 
Journal of European Public Policy), we agree with Helene Sjursen’s criticism of its 
                                                
1  Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the Workshop on Democracy Promotion, Oct. 4-5, 
2004, Center for Development, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University, and at the annual 
Workshop on International Negotiation and Conflict Resolution organized by the Department of Diplo-
macy, National Chengchi University, Taipei, March 30, 2006. We thank Frederik Adrianssens, Tina Frey-
burg, Pia Niedermeier, and Philip Schunke for research assistance as well as Mareike Kleine, Yasemin 
Pamuk, Andreas Stahn, Elsa Tulmets, and particularly Vera van Hüllen and Jolyon Howorth for their 
helpful comments and suggestions. 
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 vagueness and imprecision (Sjursen 2006a: 236). We find Manners’ attempt at defining 
normative power “that the EU exists as being different to pre-existing political forms, 
and that this particular difference predisposes it to act in a normative way” (Manners 
2002: 242) not only unclear, but bordering to tautology. Moreover, norm promotion is 
not a unique feature of the EU’s foreign policy, but fairly common for the foreign poli-
cies of great powers, as noted above.  
Last not least, the concept of “normative power” easily leads scholars to fall into the 
“norms versus interest” trap of theorizing (see also Diez 2005: 624-626). Social con-
structivists in particular should recognize that there are no interests outside social 
norms and that norm promoting agents can behave as instrumentally and strategically 
as other actors. The real issue should rather be which type of norms inform and are 
related to which type of interests. In the case of EU’s foreign policy, the “norms versus 
interests” trap still informs many analyses of its human rights and democracy promotion 
policies. The argument, for example, that the EU’s norm promotion efforts are driven by 
allegedly material interests such as security and stability overlooks that a) security and 
stability are legitimate foreign policy goals and b) that the promotion of democracy and 
human rights indeed contributes to stability in the long run. In other words, there are 
even many empirical reasons to suggest that “norms” and “interests” cannot be easily 
disentangled.2 
At first glance, the concept of “civilian power” shares the weaknesses of the notion of 
“normative power.” If civilian powers are “states which actively promote the ‘civilising’ of 
international relations” (Harnisch/Maull 2001b: 3), this borders on the same tautology 
as to say that “normative powers” promote norms. Moreover, Hedley Bull misunder-
stood Duchêne’s original formula; civilian power, according to Duchêne, does not imply 
a renunciation of the use of force under almost all circumstances but the emphasis of 
political and economic over military means to promote one’s interests (see Bull 1982; 
Duchêne 1972). As a result of this misunderstanding in the early debate, the concept of 
“civilian power” was often used as the opposite of “military power,” confusing it almost 
with pacifism.  
                                                
2  Of course, an explanatory story about the EU’s human rights and democracy promotion policies should 
evaluate the proposition that the EU only promotes human rights and democracy to the extent that this 
is consistent with its security and stability goals. Such an account would then suggest that security 
considerations trump human rights and democracy concerns in cases of norm conflict. But such an ex-
planatory story does not need to be framed in “norms vs. interests” terms, but remains inside a con-
structivist ontology. 
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 In the meantime, however, and largely overlooked by the English-speaking interna-
tional relations community, German scholars in particular have refined the concept of 
civilian power as an ideal type of foreign policy role identity in the Weberian sense. The 
Trier-based group of foreign policy analysis chaired by Hanns Maull who had written 
about “civilian power” in 1990 (Maull 1990), used it as an analytical tool to evaluate 
Germany’s post-unification policies (Harnisch/Maull 2001a; see also Kirste/Maull 1996; 
Maull 2002). Maull even invoked Germany’s contribution to the military intervention in 
Kosovo in the absence of a UN mandate as a “hard test” for the concept (Maull 2001).  
According to Maull and others, the foreign policy identity of a civilian power is charac-
terized by six elements (see Harnisch/Maull 2001b: 4; see also Maull 2001: 124-126): 
1. efforts to constrain the use of force through cooperative and collective security ar-
rangements; 
2. efforts to strengthen the rule of law through multilateral cooperation, integration, 
and partial transfers of sovereignty; 
3. promotion of democracy and human rights, both within and between states; 
4. promotion of non-violent forms of conflict management and conflict resolution; 
5. promotion of social equity and sustainable development; 
6. promotion of interdependence and division of labour. 
These elements are actually in line with Sjursen’s suggestion that strengthening the 
cosmopolitan dimension of international law would be a strong indicator for what she 
calls “normative” or “civilizing” power (Sjursen 2006a: 249; see also Scheipers/Sicurelli 
2007). Moreover, the acquisition of military capabilities and the actual use of force do 
not per se disconfirm a civilian power identity. Rather, the issue becomes in what type 
of political strategy military means are embedded, how force is used, and whether the 
use of force is legitimized by the international community. In this sense, the Kosovo 
intervention represents indeed a rather extreme test case for the concept.  
In the following, we use “civilian power” as specified above as an analytical tool to 
evaluate the EU’s foreign policy with regard to the promotion of human rights, democ-
racy, and the rule of law, on the one hand, and its participation in post-conflict peace-
keeping and stability-promotion efforts, on the other. 
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 3.  EU Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy, 
and the Rule of Law 
 
With the end of the Cold War, democracy promotion has been mainstreamed into the 
development strategies of international organizations such as the UN or the World 
Bank, but also of individual Western states such as the United States, or the Federal 
Republic of Germany. The EU is no exception. In fact, the EU has been among the first 
of any Western state or international organization to write human rights, democracy, 
and the rule of war into its agreements with external partners. The Lomé IV agreement 
of 1989 between the EU and the so-called ACP countries (African, Caribbean, and Pa-
cific Group, mostly former colonies of Great Britain, France, and Belgium) was the first 
multilateral development agreement to include political conditionality. Ten years later, 
in 1999, the EU adopted the European Initiative for Development and Human Rights 
(EIDHR) regulations (975 and 976/1999) as a comprehensive strategy “in support of 
democratisation, the strengthening of the rule of law and the development of a pluralist 
and democratic civil society” (EIDHR 976/1999, preamble).  
Today, the EU has a comprehensive approach for democracy promotion in place gov-
erning all its external relations with third countries. This includes the so-called “circle of 
friends” and the “neighbourhood policies” toward Russia, the so-called Newly Inde-
pendent States (NIS = former Soviet Republics, minus the new EU members in the 
Baltics, of course), the Balkans, the Southern Mediterranean countries, but also EU 
relations with Africa, Latin America, and Asia. The instruments used by the EU to pro-
mote human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and “good governance” look surpris-
ingly similar across the globe. Moreover, countries with an accession perspective have 
to comply with the Copenhagen criteria of 1993 focusing on democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights, and the protection of minorities before they are entitled to enter acces-
sion negotiations. Thus, the strategies and policies to promote democracy are similar, 
and the mechanisms and incentives to promote compliance vary only slightly with the 
type of third country (accession, association, partner, “circle of friends”, other third 
world countries). In fact, the EU follows quite clearly a specific cultural script. 
Thus, democracy promotion has become a centrepiece of the EU’s foreign policy and it 
is backed up by considerable financial and personal resources. Just to give a rough 
idea: the EU foreign aid managed by the EU Commission represents 12% of all inter-
national financial aid. Combined with foreign aid by individual member states, the EU 
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 and its member states account for more than 55% of all financial aid worldwide (ac-
cording to Petiteville 2003: 138, fn. 7). While precise data on democracy promotion 
funds are hard to come by, the EU and its member states combined spent ca. $ 900 
Mill. on various democracy programmes in 2001, compared to ca. $ 633 Mill. in the 
USAID democracy assistance allocation of the same year (according to Youngs 2003: 
128). The financial perspective of the European Instrument for the Promotion of De-
mocracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) envisions for the period of 2007-13 a financial 
envelope of € 1,1 billion which amounts to roughly € 160 million per year to promote 
civil society efforts promoting human rights and democracy.3 The programming for the 
new financial perspective is not available yet. But in the previous period of 2001-06, 
EIDHR projects which do not depend on government approval in the country where the 
projects take place, spent about  
 60% of its resources on democratization, governance, and rule of law issues,  
 17% on efforts to combat the death penalty and torture as well as support for the 
international judiciary system including the International Criminal Court, 
 and another 17% on fighting racism and supporting minorities as well as indigenous 
peoples (2002-04 figures, according to European Commission 2004: 9). 
If we add the democracy and human rights promotion components in programmes 
such as PHARE for the Eastern European accession states (€ 1,5 bln/year), TACIS for 
Russia and the CIS states, or ECHO, the EU’s humanitarian aid programme, the EU’s 
own funding for democracy, human rights, and good governance exceeds comparable 
U.S. programmes. If we combine it with the funding for such purposes by EU member 
states, Europe is probably by far the largest contributor to democracy promotion on the 
globe. 
With the financial perspective of 2007-13, the EU launched another attempt to main-
stream its democracy promotion approach. Existing programmes, such as TACIS, 
CARDS, or MEDA were replaced by a whole set of new instruments for development 
cooperation (DCI), stability (IfS), pre-accession assistance (IPA), and neighbourhood 
and partnership (ENPI). This new generation of instruments of cooperation is less 
geared towards specific regions (ACP, NIS, Latin America, Western Balkans) but tar-
                                                
3  Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 Decem-
ber 2006 on establishing a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human 
rights worldwide, OJ L 386, 29.12.2006, p. 1–11, Art. 19. The financing instrument replaces 
the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, established in 1999 (see below). 
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 gets specific types of countries (post-conflict, developing, accession, neighbourhood).4 
Moreover, they all contain the explicit goal of democracy promotion supported by a 
suspension clause.5 As a result of this democracy mainstreaming, the Commission had 
planned to abolish EIDHR. But due to the opposition of the European Parliament, 
which insisted that the EU needed an instrument specifically dedicated to the promo-
tion of democracy – without the consent of the governments concerned, EIDHR was 
preserved (see also below). 
The various policies developed through an incremental process of “learning by doing” 
rather than a great master plan. The instruments adopted were initially developed for 
the ACP countries, then “travelled” simultaneously to the Eastern enlargement process, 
to Russia, the NIS countries, the Mediterranean etc. While there is an explicit effort at 
exporting European values and – most recently – to distinguish these values from 
overall Western (and US American) ones, the underlying assumption of these pro-
grammes implies that the world can be shaped according to European democracy and 
welfare state standards (including the export of the European model of regional integra-
tion). This “our size fits all” (Bicchi 2006a) approach shows little sensitivity for national 
or local cultures and values, let alone an effort at exploring functional equivalents for 
Western democratic statehood in weak, failing, or failed states. National and local con-
siderations only come into play through the implementation of the programmes on the 
ground. The “top down” approach of EU democracy promotion has only changed re-
cently with the recognition that is no unitary institutional model to promote democratic 
governance and that efforts have to take into account the situation inside the particular 
country (see e.g. European Commission 2006: 5, 9). 
We will now briefly examine the history of the various EU efforts at promoting human 
rights, democracy, and the rule of law. 
 
                                                
4  The only exception are the ACP countries, whose financial assistance continues to be funded by the 
European Development Fund, while the Instrument for development cooperation applies to all the other 
developing countries (Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
18 December 2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation). 
5  The only exception is the instrument for cooperation with industrialized and other high-income coun-
tries and territories. 
 11
 EU Development Policy: Towards Economic and Political Conditionality 
 
Until the end of the 1980s, EU development policy used to be about granting preferen-
tial trade agreements and financial aid to the former colonies of member states. It cen-
tred on the Lomé agreements, the first of which was signed in 1975 between the EU 
and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group (ACP countries). The Lomé system pro-
vided the ACP countries with preferential access to the Common Market since they 
could export almost all their products custom free without reciprocating by opening their 
markets to EU imports (General System of Preferences). Political considerations came 
explicit for the first time in Lomé III (1985-90), which announced the commitment of EU 
and ACP countries to human dignity (including the value of the human person and 
equality between genders), and economic, social and cultural rights (preamble, Art. 4 
and annex I). But the agreement did not provide for any sanctions in cases of violation 
of these norms. Yet, the question of the relationship between human rights and devel-
opment had already been evoked under Lomé I (1975-80) when the EU suspended 
officially channelled aid to Uganda due to the human rights violations committed by Idi 
Amin (leaving humanitarian aid in place, however).  
It was the Lomé IVbis agreement (1995-2000) that marked the beginning of both eco-
nomic and political conditionality in EU development policy (see also Santos 2006 for 
the following). In previous agreements, the ACP countries had successfully prevented 
the EU from introducing clauses on democracy and human rights. Lomé IV, by con-
trast, included provisions on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law for the first 
time, without, however, linking them to specific sanctions. The revision of Lomé IV up-
graded the provisions on democracy, human rights and the rule of law making them 
into the essential condition for development cooperation with the EU (Art. 5). Art. 5 of 
the Lomé IVbis Convention also mentions good governance for the first time as a par-
ticular aim of cooperation operations excluding it, however, from the essential elements 
of the agreement. Most importantly, Lomé IVbis implemented the two-track approach to 
development cooperation which the Council laid out in its Resolution on Human Rights, 
Democracy, and Development.6 The pro-active promotion of these principles through 
financial assistance (indicative programmes) and open and constructive dialogue (po-
litical dialogue; Art. 30.3) is complemented by re-active sanctions in case of their viola-
tion. For violations of democracy, human rights and rule of law, however, the EU in-
                                                
6  Resolution of the European Council, November 28, 1991, OJ EEC 11-1991: 122ff. 
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 voked the suspension clause several times in the 1990s, e.g. against Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Burundi, Niger, and Sierra Leone (Holland 2002: 134).  
The Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000 and valid until 2020, terminated the Lomé 
system. Not only does Cotonou reiterate the nexus introduced by Lomé IV between 
development, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance (pream-
ble). It broadens the scope of development cooperation to peace-building and conflict 
prevention stressing “an integrated approach taking account at the same time political, 
economic, social, cultural and environmental aspects of development” (Art. 1.2). More-
over, political conditionality was strengthened. Title II develops the political dialogue 
introduced by Lomé IVbis into a pro-active instrument of conflict prevention in the area 
of peacekeeping, human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and good governance. Art. 
8.2 stresses the preventive character of the political dialogue which shall preclude the 
use of sanctions. It shall foster the exchange of information and the development of a 
mutual understanding of the meaning and application of the principles and strategies 
laid down in the Convention. 
The underlying approach corresponds closely to the Open Method of Coordination (e.g. 
Hodson/Maher 2001). Unlike in previous Lomé Agreements, the EU no longer unilater-
ally imposes certain development policies. Rather, goals and principles shall be formu-
lated in consensus with the developing countries and jointly evaluated on the basis of 
formerly agreed benchmarking criteria. Periodic monitoring, evaluation, and peer re-
view shall induce processes of mutual learning through the diffusion of best practice. 
These processes of coordination are complemented by reinforced efforts at capacity 
building. In Cotonou, capacity-building is no longer confined to the public sector but 
includes the strengthening of civil society (Art. 7). Non-governmental actors, including 
the private sector, have a right to be consulted and incorporated into the political dia-
logue. They shall get involved in projects funded under Cotonou, and finally, qualify for 
support of organizational capacity building and financial assistance. Yet, soft coordina-
tion and capacity building still take place in the shadow of sanctions. The suspension 
clause is retained and extended to good governance, but only as far as serious cases 
of corruption are concerned, which significantly narrows the enforceable parts of good 
governance.  
Unlike under previous agreements, Cotonou made EU financial assistance, mostly pro-
vided by the European Development Fund, conditional upon the performance of the 
recipient country with regard to certain indicators including the implementation of re-
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 forms on democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance (Art. 3.1b, 
Annex IV; for an excellent assessment see Beck/Conzelmann 2004). In contrast to 
Lomé IV, the EU now has complete discretion in the allocation of its development funds 
(Art. 3, Annex IV, 57.5). The decision, however, which specific programmes and pro-
jects are to be funded with how much money, is subject to negotiations with the indi-
vidual recipient countries as specified in Art. 4.3 Annex IV of the Cotonou Agreement. 
Since the conditions for resource allocation are no longer fixed by the agreement but to 
be negotiated, the procedural regulations create a strong incentive for the recipient 
countries to comply with the principles guiding EU development policy. 
In sum, EU development policy changed significantly during the 1990s. The EU has 
subsequently institutionalized democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and good gov-
ernance as the guiding principles of its development policy. In order to promote these 
principles, the EU gives priority to a “positive approach” outlined in the Council Resolu-
tion on human rights, democracy, and development in 1991. Rather than pressuring 
recipient countries into compliance, an “open and constructive dialogue” is supposed to 
stimulate the respect for human rights and encourage democracy.  
 
EU Enlargement Policy: From Association to Accession  
 
Eastern enlargement has been the most ambitious effort of the EU to promote democ-
racy, human rights, and the rule of law in third countries. The prospect of membership 
helped transform ten former communist countries into consolidated liberal democracies 
with functioning market economies in less than 15 years. Since so much has been writ-
ten on Eastern enlargement, we can be rather brief here (e.g. Kelley 2004; Schimmelf-
ennig 2003; Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005; Grabbe 2003; Gheciu 2005).  
After the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the EU started to shift 
its priorities from the ACP countries to the transition countries. However, the EU used 
policy tools developed in its cooperation agreements with the ACP countries and 
adapted them to the situation in Central Eastern Europe. The so called Europe Agree-
ments were meant to support the economic, political and social transition in Central 
and Eastern Europe. They contained provisions on democracy, human rights, and the 
rule of law, without linking them to an explicit suspension clause. Like in development 
policy until Lomé IVbis (pre-1995), these principles constituted essential elements 
whose violation would allow the taking of “appropriate measures”. The 1993 Copenha-
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 gen European Council then formally accepted the possibility of membership of all as-
sociated CEE countries – provided that they achieve (1) a functioning market economy; 
(2) stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and re-
spect for and protection of minorities, and market economy, and (3) the ability of im-
plementing the acquis communautaire (Copenhagen criteria). Thus, the Europe 
Agreements became the framework for the applicant countries’ integration into the EU. 
While making accession conditional upon compliance with the Copenhagen criteria 
(positive conditionality), they still contained no explicit suspension clauses. These 
were, however, introduced by the so-called Accession Partnerships introduced in 1998, 
which defined specific priorities in the accession process agreed upon between the 
Commission and the candidate country, making financial aid under the three pre-
accession instruments PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD conditional upon compliance with 
democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law, and market economy. Failure to 
respect these general conditions could lead to a decision by the Council on the sus-
pension of pre-accession financial assistance (negative conditionality). 
Yet, negative conditionality was hardly ever invoked. As in development policy, pre-
accession financial assistance was meant to help candidate countries comply with the 
Copenhagen criteria. The PHARE programme (Poland and Hungary Aid for Economic 
Reconstruction)7 provided € 1,5 billion per year of financial assistance to prepare the 
candidates for institution-building, adopting the acquis, and implementing Structural 
Funds after accession (cf. Bailey/de Propris 2004). The focus of PHARE has been on 
capacity-building in the public sector rather than on supporting political reforms. Only a 
small part was dedicated to the promotion of democracy. The PHARE Democracy Pro-
gramme was established in 1992 but integrated in the European Initiative of Democ-
racy and Human Rights in 1994 where it ceased as a regional programme in 1996 
when EIDHR became a horizontal instrument of EU democracy assistance. 
Moreover, countries seeking access for financial assistance had to provide clear com-
mitments regarding the rule of law, respect for human rights, establishment of a multi-
party system, the holding of free elections, and introducing a market economy 
(Maresceau 2003: 12f). Consequently, the EU did not have to resort to negative con-
ditionality suspending the association agreements. It has, however, delayed the con-
                                                
7  Initially meant to help Poland and Hungary make the transition to market economy, PHARE was 
quickly extended to other transition countries preparing them for EU membership. 
 15
 clusion of accession agreements and the provision of financial aid with Rumania and 
Bulgaria in order to encourage political and economic reforms.  
Finally, the EU relied on political dialogue to deal with problems of non-compliance. 
Regular bilateral meetings at the highest political level between the EU and the individ-
ual candidate countries allowed for consultations and the exchange of views on all top-
ics of common interest related to the enlargement process. Comparable to EU devel-
opment policy, the political dialogues have been crucial to clarify the conditions for 
(opening negotiations for) membership.  
Moreover, the Commission monitored the performance of each candidate and reported 
the progress in an annual report presented to the Council together with recommenda-
tions for improvement. These annual progress reports, first published in 1997, intro-
duced a system of benchmarking between the accession candidates. The annual pro-
gress reports have included an assessment of the political Copenhagen criteria, de-
mocracy, the rule of law, human rights, and minority rights (cf. Kochenov 2004).8 Also, 
the Commission and the European Parliament would officially reprimand accession 
countries for cases of serious non-compliance with these principles (Maresceau 2003: 
32-34). Thus, political dialogue has always taken place “in the shadow of accession” 
(membership conditionality). 
Given the success of Eastern enlargement as a transformation tool for the consolida-
tion of CEE democratic transition, the EU invoked membership conditionality as an 
instrument to stabilize another region that has been vital to its geopolitical interests: the 
Western Balkans. While the EU had been unable (and initially unwilling) to prevent mili-
tary conflict in the region, it has been engaged in the stabilization and reconstruction 
since the early 1990s. The EU’s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) has provided emer-
gency supplies, technical assistance and related support since the first war in 1991. 
After the Kosovo conflict broke out in 1998, the EU changed its approach toward the 
Western Balkans. It had become clear by now that development cooperation would not 
be sufficient to stabilize the region so close to the EU’s borders. The Stability Pact for 
South-Eastern Europe of 1999 promised candidate status to Croatia, Macedonia, Alba-
nia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and Bosnia-Herzegovina as soon as 
they would meet the Copenhagen criteria. The Pact introduced a political dialogue or-
                                                
8  Note that protecting minority rights is not included in the Treaties. Thus, the EU requires accession 
countries to comply with standards that do not apply to member states. For details on EU policies con-
cerning minority rights see Kelley (2004). 
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 ganized in three “working tables” on democratization and human rights, economic re-
construction and development, and security and justice and home affairs. The Com-
mission periodically assessed whether the candidates complied with democracy, hu-
man rights, and the rule of law. Its assessment, annually published in regular reports, 
determined whether the EU would sign a cooperation agreement providing additional 
incentives for political and economic reform, such as trade concessions and additional 
financial aid from PHARE. In 2000, the EU introduced CARDS (Community Assistance 
for Reconstruction, Development, and Stabilization) as a proper instrument of financial 
assistance for the Western Balkans. Technical assistance was also provided by ex-
tending “Twinning” and TAIEX (Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office). 
Next to funding immediate projects of political and economic reconstruction, the Com-
mission granted selective incentives, such as autonomous trade preferences as a re-
ward for specific reforms. The Stabilization and Accession Process (SAP) launched in 
1999 reinforced the efforts of the EU to secure political and economic stability in the 
Western Balkans and bring them into the enlargement process. If the candidates satis-
fied political conditionality, they could open negotiations with the EU for a Stability and 
Association Agreement (SAA) as the first formal step towards accession and subse-
quently enter so called European Integration Partnerships, which are explicitly mod-
elled on the Accession Partnerships setting short and medium-term priorities for ap-
proximation (although they only contain a suspension clause since 2007).  
The pre-accession strategy for the Western Balkans closely follows the CEE trajectory 
combining financial incentives with trade concessions in the shadow of (positive) mem-
bership conditionality (Kelley 2006; Magen 2006: 513-516). Yet so far, EU membership 
has not motivated Balkan leaders very strongly to undertake the necessary reforms as 
was the case in Central and Eastern Europe, where regime transformation had been 
peaceful. Problems of economic backwardness, feeble state institutions, ethnic con-
flicts, and political extremism are much more severe due to the major wars the Balkan 
region had suffered. Membership puts up a far greater challenge than for the CEE 
countries and thus remains a rather distant prospect. The new financial instrument for 
pre-accession assistance introduced in 2007 is unlikely to change these unfavourable 
conditions, even though it contains an explicit suspension clause.9 
                                                
9  Council Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006 of 17 July 2006 establishing an Instrument for Pre-Accession 
Assistance (IPA), OJ L 210, 31.7.2006, p. 82–93. 
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 EU Neighbourhood Policy: Friends, not Members! 
 
The promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law also constitutes the 
core of the EU’s effort in achieving political and economic stability in its immediate 
neighbourhood. Eastern enlargement has stretched the EU’s backyard considerably 
East, as a result of which Russia, Ukraine, and some of the Newly Independent States 
have been admitted to the club of “close friends”. In order to turn the region into an 
area of security, stability, and prosperity, the EU applied the methods and instruments 
that had proven so successful in promoting economic political liberalization in the CEE 
countries. Thus, the EU uses the same strategies and instruments to induce these 
countries into compliance with the Copenhagen criteria as it has done with the CEE 
and the Western Balkans (Kelley 2006; Magen 2006) – with one major exception. In 
sharp contrast to Central and South Eastern European countries, the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements (PCAs), which the EU has entered since 1997, envision close 
trade relations and political cooperation but not EU membership. Moreover, they aim 
for a political dialogue on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law but do not con-
tain an explicit suspension clause as the Accession Partnerships do. In case of viola-
tion of democratic principles and human rights, the Council may take appropriate 
measures regarding financial assistance granted by TACIS (Technical Assistance for 
the Commonwealth of Independent States), and INTERREG (the PHARE cross-border 
cooperation programme). Thus, the PCAs lack clear provisions of both effective posi-
tive and negative conditionality. Like PHARE and CARDS, financial assistance under 
TACIS focused on building capacities for political, legal and administrative reforms 
aimed at promoting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law rather than using EU 
funding as a positive or negative incentive to introduce reforms. This also applied to the 
TACIS Democracy Programme, which had been established in 1992 but, like PHARE, 
was subsumed under the EIDHR in 1996. It remains to be seen, whether this will 
change with the new ENPI (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument), 
which replaced TACIS and MEDA in 2007 and introduces an explicit suspension 
clause.10  
                                                
10  Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 
laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, 
OJ L 310, 9.11.2006, p. 1–14. ENPI is to finance joint programmes that follow the model of the Struc-
tural Funds being based on multi-annual programming and co-financing. 
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 In 2003, the EU launched its official European Neighbourhood Policy to offer a privi-
leged relationship to its immediate neighbours building upon a mutual commitment to 
common values (democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market 
economy principles and sustainable development). It also includes the Southern 
neighbours so far treated under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (see below). The 
ENP seeks to go beyond existing forms of cooperation offering a deeper political rela-
tionship and economic integration. The central element of the European Neighbour-
hood Policy is the bilateral ENP Action Plan agreed between the EU and each partner. 
These set out an agenda of political and economic reforms with short and medium-term 
priorities. Implementation is jointly promoted and monitored through sub-Committees 
and the Commission, which closely evaluates the progress reports the partner coun-
tries have to submit on a regular basis. 
While the EU adopted a more bilateral approach to its far Eastern friends, its policy 
towards the Mediterranean neighbours used to be based on a regional (multilateral) 
framework (for details see Bicchi 2007; Gomez 2003: 25-41). The EU decided to up-
grade its relations with the Mediterranean after the end of the Cold War and the rise of 
new security challenges in the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East. As in the 
case of its development policy, the EU realized that preferential trade agreements nei-
ther reduced the development gap between the Mediterranean countries and EU 
member states nor did they have an impact on democratic reforms. The “Barcelona 
Process”, established by the Barcelona Declaration of the Euro-Mediterranean Confer-
ence in 1995, sought to re-launch the EU-Mediterranean cooperation and provide it 
with a multilateral framework. It identified three baskets11 on which the new Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership would focus: political stability and security, economic and 
financial cooperation, and cooperation on social, cultural and humanitarian issues. 
These goals were to be operationalized in a working programme and the EU provided 
financial and technical assistance for its implementation through MEDA (Mediterranean 
Development Assistance) and through loans of the European Investment Bank. The 
signatories of the Barcelona Declaration de facto subscribed to the Copenhagen crite-
ria, which are not, however, mentioned. Rather the Declaration provides a catalogue of 
principles against which the cooperative behaviour of the participating countries could 
be assessed and be made subject to a political dialogue on the progress made. The 
                                                
11  The similarity with CSCE terminology is no coincidence. It is reminiscent of the failed attempt to launch 
a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean in 1990. 
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 Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAA) restate the provisions on democ-
racy and human rights. Like the Euro-Agreements with the CEE accession countries, 
the Stabilization and Association Agreements with the Western Balkan states, and the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the post-Soviet countries, these bilateral 
agreements between the EU and specific Mediterranean countries define human rights 
and democracy as essential elements (but not rule of law and market economy) and 
allow the partners to take “appropriate measures” in case of violation. This also applies 
to MEDA, the equivalent to PHARE, CARDS, and TACIS, which includes, however, the 
principle of rule of law. As is the case with the other regions, the part of financial assis-
tance explicitly dedicated to democracy promotion was administered through a special 
programme, MEDA Democracy, which subsequently became part of the EIDHR (see 
below). Until recently, neither MEDA nor the EMAAs contained any explicit provisions 
of either positive or negative conditionality. Rather and in line with the partnership prin-
ciple emphasized in the Barcelona Declaration, the EMAAs establish bilateral political 
dialogue as the instrument to deal with problems of compliance with democracy and 
human rights. This may change with the integration of MEDA in the new financial in-
strument for the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENPI), which includes an explicit 
suspension clause.  
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership institutionalized an ongoing process of negotia-
tions and consultations among the governments and non-governmental actors across a 
wide range of issues. But there has been only little transition from dialogue to action. 
The Arab-Israeli conflict and the breakdown of the Middle East Process in 1996/97, in 
particular, have seriously obstructed the implementation of the Barcelona Working Pro-
gramme. Measures on strengthening democracy and the respect for human rights have 
been sidelined by the gulf between the signatories on security issues and the rejection 
of EU interference with domestic policies by the Mediterranean countries. As a result, 
economic and financial cooperation has become the centre piece of the Barcelona 
process. MEDA Democracy has funded projects directed towards training and educa-
tion on human rights and democracy, awareness campaigns, women’s rights and the 
media. However, as Federica Bicchi (2006b) points out, MEDA Democracy tended to 
privilege partnerships between European NGOs and local NGOs. In particular, the EU 
has refused to fund groups that are considered Islamic, even though at least some of 
these groups form the cornerstone of civil society in the Arab world (Bicchi 2006b). 
Furthermore, the EU’s difficulties with democracy promotion in the Middle East and its 
inherent contradictions resulting from conflicting objectives became particularly appar-
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 ent when Hamas, the terrorist organization that nevertheless provides most social ser-
vices in Palestine, won the Palestinian elections in early 2006. It must be noted in this 
context that Palestinian governance is essentially on the payroll of the EU and its 
member states (ca. € 500 Mill./year). The attempt to reconcile the conflicting goals of 
democracy promotion versus preventing the ultimate derailing of the Middle Eastern 
peace process resulted in an uneasy conditional engagement with the new Palestinian 
government (Tocci 2006). 
While not belonging to its immediate neighbours, the EU has also intensified its coop-
eration with Asia and Latin America during the 1990s. Latin America receives EU fi-
nancial assistance under the ALA programme. In the mid-1990s, the EU signed 
agreements with Mexico, Chile and the MERCOSUR to prepare them for association. 
All three agreements create a framework for political dialogue on issues of democracy, 
human rights, and the rule of law. Chile was the first to conclude the association 
agreement in 2002. It contains provisions on democracy human rights, the rule of law, 
and good governance. 
In its relations with Asia, the EU has been less effective in pushing human rights and 
democracy. The cooperation agreement between the EU and ASEAN, signed in 1980, 
did not contain any provisions on democracy and human rights. With its Asian Strategy 
adopted in 1994, the EU has sought to intensify the political dialogue with Asian coun-
tries but issues of human rights and democracy have been largely banned from the 
agenda of the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM) established in 1996 and the talks within 
the regional forum of ASEAN (ARF). Bilateral cooperation agreements with India 
(1994), Sri Lanka (1995), Nepal (1997), Cambodia (1997), Vietnam (1997), Bangla-
desh (2000), and Pakistan (2001) contain democracy and human rights clauses. In 
contrast, China, South Korea, Laos, the Philippines, and Malaysia refused to have po-
litical conditionality included in their sectoral trade agreements with the EU. While the 
promotion of human rights and democracy has been incorporated in the Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreements with Central Asian countries, there appears to be quite a 
gap between rhetoric and reality in the EU’s approach to the region (Warkotsch 2006). 
It remains to be seen whether the new Central Asian strategy promoted by the German 
EU presidency is going to change the situation. The same is true for the new financial 
instrument of development cooperation (DCI), which shall finance development pro-
jects in Central Asia, Asia, South Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. After all, 
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 DCI explicitly refers to democracy and human rights and contains a suspension clause 
(see above). 
 
The European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) 
 
As demonstrated above, the EU has mainstreamed its external relations with third 
countries with regard to the promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. 
Since the Maastricht Treaty came into force in 1992, the EU must contribute to the de-
veloping and consolidating democracy, human rights, and human rights in its relations 
with third countries. While the agreements with ACP countries even contain an explicit 
suspension clause for cases in which these principles are violated, others allow the EU 
at least to take appropriate measures. Moreover, the EU must not enter an agreement 
with states that blatantly violate human rights and principles of democracy. Only few 
countries have been able to resist this form of political conditionality, among them the 
U.S., Australia, and China.  
While democracy and human rights mainstreaming has been an incremental process, 
the EU has established in 1994 the European Initiative for Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIDHR), a specific financial tool to promote democracy and human rights. Like 
regional democracy assistance programmes, such as PHARE Democracy, MEDA De-
mocracy, or TACIS Democracy, EIDHR has specifically focused on democracy and 
human rights (including administrative accountability and the fight against corruption, 
i.e. good governance). What has been special about EIDHR is that it can be imple-
mented with partners other than national governments (and without their consent), and 
in particular with non-governmental organizations and international organizations. 
Thus, EIDHR allows to circumvent the governments of the recipient countries and can 
be used even if other programs have been suspended, e.g. in cases of violations of 
human rights. Since 1994, the EIDHR has provided funding (ca. € 100 mill./year) for 
projects that promote representative structures in both government and working place, 
access to reliable information, ethical practices in government and public service agen-
cies, principles of equal opportunity and non-discrimination against minorities, respect 
for human rights, just to name a few.  
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 In 1999, the EU passed two Regulations12 as an attempt to establish a coherent 
framework for the EU’s global efforts in “developing and consolidating democracy and 
the rule of law and so that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
third countries”. One Regulation covered operations within the framework of EU devel-
opment cooperation. The other Regulation replaced democracy assistance of existing 
regional programmes, such as PHARE Democracy, TACIS Democracy, and MEDA 
Democracy (Art. 2).  
In 2006, EIDHR was renamed into European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights.13 As already mentioned, the Commission considered EIDHR superfluous after 
the creation of the new financial instruments of cooperation. However, thanks to the 
pressure of the European Parliament, the unique feature of EIDHR was preserved.  
The EIDHR is the only instrument comparable to the National Endowment for Democ-
racy or the German party foundations since it allows circumventing the governments of 
the recipient countries. The debate about its future has triggered demands for an EU 
agency for providing democracy assistance. Thus, the European Parliament and politi-




For a long time and similar to most other Western political systems, the EU had ignored 
the promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Its development policy 
mainly focused on economic cooperation. Moreover, the member states had made 
hardly any effort to bring their policies in line with the EU. Consequently, the role of the 
EU had been rather weak acting as an additional donor rather than a coordinator of 
European development policies (Stokke 1995). By 1999 at the latest, everything had 
changed. The EU now has a comprehensive framework for the promotion of democ-
racy, human rights, the rule of law, and “good governance” in place covering the entire 
globe. The various programmes concern accession candidates with a membership per-
spective, the “circle of friends” and immediate neighbours which are explicitly to be kept 
out of the union, as well as the ACP countries, Latin America, and Asia. The EU is 
                                                
12  Council Regulations 975/1999 and 976/1999 adopted on April 29, 1999, preamble, OJ 120/8 of May 8, 
1999. 
13  Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 
on establishing a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide, OJ 
L 386, 29.12.2006, p. 1–11. 
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 making an explicit effort to project its own identity of a democratic polity into its rela-
tions with third countries (Manners/Whitman 2003; Diez 2005; Magen 2006). The goal 
of democracy assistance is enshrined in the EU treaties since the early 1990s, has 
been formulated in the 1999 Regulations on Democracy and Human Rights in a com-
prehensive fashion and reinforced by the reform of existing financial instruments in 
2007. This reform make financial assistance, not specifically dedicated to democracy 
promotion, conditional upon the respect of human rights, democracy, and the rule of 
law providing for an explicit suspension clause that applies to all three principles. Thus, 
while partnership and cooperation agreements remain rather vague, the financial in-
struments introduce negative conditionality through the back door. 
The various policies consist of remarkably similar tools which usually encompass three 
types of instruments (see table 1). These instruments differ mainly with regard to the 
steering mechanisms by which democracy and human rights are being diffused. First, 
“political dialogues” use persuasion and learning strategies. Second, political condi-
tionality clauses try to manipulate cost-benefit calculations through creating incentive 
structures (positive and negative). Finally, there are various programmes in place 
geared toward capacity-building for institutionalizing democracy, human rights, and the 
rule of law. 
The most remarkable feature of these three types of instruments is their similarity 
across regions. The EU follows one single cultural script that it uses to promote democ-
racy, human rights, and the rule of law across the globe. With EIDHR at the latest, pol-
icy goals and instruments have been streamlined and written into the union’s standard 
operating procedures. If the programmes vary at all, it concerns their budgetary alloca-
tions. While the programmes and instruments appear to be strikingly similar, this does 
not mean that the EU ignores local conditions or applies these instruments in a uniform 
way. Indeed, the empowerment of the EU Delegations in the various countries in the 
implementation and management of these programmes together with the de-centraliza-
tion of their administration should lead to a greater sensitivity to the varying political, 
economic, and cultural situations on the ground.  
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14  Election monitoring is also an important part of democracy promotion. However, it is orthogonal to the 
instruments of conditionality, political dialogue and capacity-building. Thus, it provides the basis for in-
voking conditionality by monitoring an essential element of democracy, namely fair and free elections.  
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 How does this EU approach to the promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule 
of law perform with regard to the criteria of a “civilian power’s” role identity developed 
above? In general, the conformity between the identity of a “civilian power” and the 
EU’s programs to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law worldwide is 
striking. This begins with the measures to sustain the legalization of world politics 
through the International Criminal Court (Scheipers/Sicurelli 2007) and other interna-
tional legal instruments and ends with support for local human rights NGOs in various 
countries. Interestingly enough, the programs are also fairly consistent with the EU 
Security Strategy (European Council 2003). The EU approach reflects its preference 
for “soft security” and “soft power” in its foreign policy inducing compliance with its poli-
cies by positive incentives, capacity-building, and persuasion and learning (Magen 
2006). Compliance management rather than enforcement does not only correspond to 
the EU self-understanding as a civilian power. In the absence of uniform criteria for the 
evaluation of compliance and application of sanctions in case of violation, a coop-
erative and process-oriented approach allows to develop a common understanding of 
the behavioural requirements under the Copenhagen criteria. Socialization also ap-
pears to be more promising since the EU has no means of forcing the more than 120 
countries with which it signed cooperation and association agreements into compliance 
with democracy and human rights norms. This is often overlooked by the human rights 
community and by scholars alike who question the EU’s sincerity in these programs, 
because it mainly uses carrots rather than sticks.  
Of course, implementation on the ground is a different matter. The EU is often using 
double standards when dealing with human rights violators. It is tough on Myanmar, but 
rather soft on China. In many cases, it does not use the instruments available in the 
various partnership agreements or uses them only reluctantly (see e.g. Youngs 2004; 
Santos 2006; Kelley 2006). Nevertheless, a quantitative study by Hadewych Hazelzet 
of the use of EU carrots and sticks in its human rights policies during the 1990s did not 
reveal a particular bias in one way or the other. In particular, Hazelzet tested various 
“realist” hypotheses in order to get a measurement for supposedly strategic security 
and economic interests, but these hypotheses could not be verified (Hazelzet 2001). In 
short, it is certainly true that the EU human rights and democracy promotion policies 
are implemented in a differential way and that these norms do not always trump other 
concerns. But it is equally true that the standard rationalist account according to which 
economic and security concerns are usually prior to democracy and human rights 
goals, cannot be confirmed, either. 
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 One should not overlook in this context that the evolution of EU democracy promotion 
programmes did not follow a grand design, but incremental “learning by doing” (see 
also Kelley 2006; Magen 2006). The policy instruments of conditionality were first de-
veloped in relations with the ACP countries as part of the 1990 Lomé IV agreement. 
From there, the Commission quickly introduced positive (membership) and a weak 
form of negative conditionality (appropriate measures) into the so-called Europe 
Agreements with the Central Eastern European countries during the early 1990s. By 
the mid-1990s, (positive) political conditionality had become an essential ingredient of 
the EU strategy for democracy promotion.  
A similar process of a new instrument travelling from one EU regional strategy to an-
other can be observed with regard to capacity building including knowledge transfer 
and financial assistance. In this context, it was the PHARE programme for Central 
Eastern Europe which was initially developed for Poland and Hungary in 1989. One 
year later, TACIS was created to help the transition process in Russia and the Soviet 
successor states. The experiences with PHARE and TACIS were then used to build the 
MEDA programme for the Mediterranean region in 1995, and the CARDS programme 
for the Western Balkans and the former Soviet Republics in 2000. The regional pro-
grammes were finally replaced in 2007 by a set of new instruments that made financial 
assistance conditional upon compliance with the respect for democracy, human rights 
and the rule of law. Through the back door, the EU has introduced negative condition-
ality to the relations with all third countries. 
Moreover, the early regional external cooperation programmes, PHARE and TACIS, 
developed specific budget lines for democracy assistance in 1992. They were sub-
sumed under the newly created European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 
in 1994. So was MEDA Democracy, established in 1995, when in 1999 the EU turned 
the EIDHR into a global instrument of democracy promotion. 
In sum, in the course of the 1990s, the EU has embarked on a major effort at “value 
export” seeking to incorporate the promotion of a specific European version of democ-
racy into its external relations with the rest of the world. In this regard, the EU is sur-
prisingly explicit about promoting a particular democratic self-understanding and iden-
tity distinguishing itself from, e.g., the U.S. version of democracy and capitalism. Ex-
amples for such identity markers in the human rights area include the opposition to the 
death penalty and an emphasis on social and economic rights. Concerning regional 
cooperation, the EU tries to promote its own model of regional integration, i.e., includ-
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 ing strong supranational institutions and going beyond mere free trade areas. In Latin 
America, for example, the U.S. and the EU seem to compete in advertising their pre-
ferred models of regional integration. As Bicchi points out with regard to the Mediterra-
nean, this externalization of one’s own institutional design can be well explained by 
sociological institutionalism’s emphasis on institutional isomorphism (see Bicchi 2006a 
referring to DiMaggio/Powell 1991). 
EU democracy and human rights promotion might be considered an easy case to con-
firm the identity of a “civilian power.” Therefore we will now turn to the ESDP and EU 
peacekeeping missions which have been labelled by some as the militarization of EU 
foreign policy (e.g. Manners 2006; similarly Smith 2000). Moreover, policies requiring 
military action are often seen as dividing Europe while the member states are much 
more united over issues of human rights and environmental protection (Keohane 2002; 
Scheipers/Sicurelli 2007). We will explore the extent to which the EU’s identity as a 




4.  The EU and Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management, and 
Peacekeeping Missions 
 
In 2003, just when the Iraq crisis dwarfed once again the EU’s attempt to develop an 
effective Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU launched its first 
autonomous military operation. While the member states were deeply divided over U.S. 
military intervention in Iraq, on 31 March 2003 EU forces took over NATO’s Operation 
Allied Harmony in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). On 1 Janu-
ary 2003, only two months before, the EU had launched its first-ever civilian crisis 
management operation. The EU Police Mission (EUPM) replaced the United Nations’ 
International Police Task Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina seeking to establish law en-
forcement capabilities at the local level. Both EU missions have been part of UN 
Peacekeeping Operations.  
Since 2003, the EU has launched altogether 17 missions within the framework of the 
ESDP. Among them are (see the database in Abellan 2007; cf. Howorth 2007: Chapter 
6) 
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  Police missions: EUPM (mentioned above); Proxima (FYR Macedonia, 2003-05); 
EUPAT (FYR Macedonia, 2005-06); EUPOL COPPS (Palestine, since 2006); 
EUPOL Kinshasa (DR Congo, since 2004);  
 Border assistance missions: Border Assistance to Moldova and Ukraine (since 
2005); EUBAM Rafah (Palestine, since 2005); 
 Missions to support the rule of law: EUJUST Themis (Georgia, 2004-05); EUJUST 
Lex (Iraq, since 2006); EUPT Kosovo (since 2006); 
 Monitoring and security sector reform missions: AMM (Banda Aceh, 2005-06); 
EUSEC DR Congo (since 2005); AMIS II (Sudan, since 2006); 
 Military peacekeeping operations: Concordia (FYR Macedonia, 400 troops, 2003); 
Artemis (DR Congo, 1800 troops, 2003); EUFOR Althea (Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
7000 troops, since 2004); EUFOR DRCongo (1450 troops, 2006). 
In addition, one should mention the substantial EU engagement in the post-conflict 
reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan where the EU is the largest single 
donor of humanitarian assistance. Moreover, EU member states such as Britain, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and others provide troops for the NATO led 
“International Security Assistance Force” (ISAF) and for “Operation Enduring Free-
dom,” the US-led war on terror against Al Quaeda and the Taliban (details in Gross 
2006).  
Finally, the EU and its member states are heavily involved in the Middle Eastern con-
flicts. For quite a while, the EU has been involved in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and 
maintains two ESDP missions in Palestine. The E3 (Britain, France, Germany), the 
other permanent members of the UN Security Council, and the EU High Representa-
tive are engaged in the diplomatic effort to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weap-
ons. Individual EU member states such as Britain still deploy troops in Iraq and are 
engaged in the stabilization efforts there. Most recently and probably most significantly 
with regard to the long-term consequences, EU member states – with the explicit ap-
proval of the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council – lead and supply 
more than half of the troops monitoring and enforcing the ceasefire in Lebanon that 
ended the armed conflict between the Hizbollah militia and the Israeli Defence Forces. 
While UNIFIL II constitutes a UN peacekeeping operation mandated by Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1701 of 11 August 2006, EU members have taken the lead in this mis-
sion (details in Dembinski 2007). 
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 The military component of ESDP was systematically introduced by the European 
Councils in Helsinki (1999) and Nice (2000).15 In Helsinki, the EU member states de-
cided to establish the “headline goal” of an EU military intervention force, i.e. the ca-
pacity of the EU to deploy within 60 days, and sustain for at least one year, up to 
60.000 troops. The Nice Treaty established a new crisis management system for EU-
led military operations. As in CFSP, member states are directly responsible for initiating 
and implementing EU military crisis management operations. Decisions to launch mili-
tary – as well as civilian – operations take the form of joint actions agreed in the Gen-
eral Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). The rotating Presidency of the 
Council and the Secretary-General/High Representative of CFSP also exercise powers 
of initiative. The Commission and the European Parliament, by contrast, are merely 
informed and not directly involved in any decisions taken. The newly established Politi-
cal and Security Committee (PSC) keeps track of international developments, helps 
define policies and monitors implementation of agreed policies. The latest development 
to strengthen military crisis management was the commitment of the member states in 
2004 to the establishment of 13 EU Battlegroups. They shall form the core of a rapid 
reaction force of 1.500 troops deployable within ten days for a period of 30 to 120 days. 
The civilian component of ESDP was developed by the European Councils of Feira 
(2000) and Gothenburg (2001). In Feira, the member states established the headline 
goals for civilian crisis management in four areas: 
 police cooperation: the capacity of the EU to deploy 2.300 police officers (European 
Gendarmerie Force, finally created in 2006), including 800 gendarmes within 30 
days, for tasks ranging from restoring order in cooperation with military forces to the 
training of local police; 
 strengthening the rule of law: the possibility of providing up to 200 judges, prosecu-
tors, and other legal experts; 
 civilian administration: the possibility of providing a team to prepare or monitor elec-
tions, taxation, education, water provision etc.; 
 civilian protection: possibility of assisting humanitarian actions through emergency 
operations, i.e. the immediate deployment of two to three assessment teams of ten 
experts each as well as intervention teams of 2.000 persons. 
                                                
15  For an excellent overview see Howorth (2007: Chapter 2). 
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 The third component of ESDP – next to military and civilian crisis management – is 
conflict prevention. It seeks to establish/restore a favourable political and economic 
environment in precarious regions. Since conflict prevention entails a comprehensive 
set of instruments that cut across all three pillars of the European Union, the European 
Commission plays a key role. It shall ensure the integration and consistency of all EU 
action. Next to developing an early-warning system, the European Commission fo-
cuses on developing crisis management instruments, such as the Rapid Reaction 
Mechanism introduced in 2000, enabling the Commission to rapidly disburse funds to 
conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction projects. 
The EU policy toward Peacekeeping Operations is firmly integrated in an overall frame-
work of crisis management, which the EU explicitly laid out in its European Security 
Strategy (ESS; European Council 2003). The ESS defines democracy, human rights, 
and the rule of law as the core European values, on which the EU has been built and 
which shape its vision of the world. This vision is based on the premise that creating a 
democratic society is the best way to achieve peace, stability and wealth. The ESS 
also lays out the two sets of instruments by which these goals are to be achieved: “soft 
power” and “effective multilateralism” (European Council 2003: 9f). Thus, the EU in-
volvement in UN Peacekeeping Operations in Former Yugoslavia and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo has to be seen as part of a greater effort on which the EU has em-
barked to export its values in order to bring peace and stability to other countries and 
regions, particularly but not exclusively in its close neighbourhood.  
In sum, within a relatively short period of time, namely five years, the EU has become a 
major player in post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction efforts including robust 
peacekeeping. With regard to the latter, EU members provide by far the largest number 
of troops in the various missions, be it under UN auspices, under NATO or under EU 
command.16 All EU-led military peacekeeping operations are legitimized by UN Secu-
rity Council resolutions, normally under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. As a result, the 
EU is now a major subcontractor of the UN with regard to peacekeeping. It should also 
be noted that the EU missions are embedded in larger political stabilization and peace-
building efforts that include the promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of 
law, as described above. Take EUFOR DR Congo, for example: While it has been 
rightly criticized as too limited in scope and timescale (see Gegout 2007), the EU spent 
€ 750 million in Congo on development, economic, and humanitarian aid including 
                                                
16  Note that the U.S. usually does not provide troops in multilateral peacekeeping operations. 
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 sponsoring the elections in 2006. For an international body, this is quite unique. It en-
ables the EU to provide a whole package of political, economic, social, cultural, and 
military measures in crisis prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict situations 
even though coordination between the various EU agencies and the EU delegations on 
the ground is often problematic. 
 
Evaluation: Still a Civilian Power? 
 
How are the increasing military role of the EU and the various military missions to be 
evaluated? Are we seeing the gradual militarization of European foreign policy, is Ve-
nus approaching Mars, to use Kagan’s famous term (Kagan 2003; see also Smith 
2000)? We argue that, quite on the contrary, the EU is only recently emerging as a 
civilian world power, precisely because it only now disposes of the entire spectrum of 
policy instruments necessary to effectively promote the “civilization” of international 
relations. In that sense, the recent ESDP missions constitute the first signs that the EU 
is actually taking “effective multilateralism” seriously and that EU puts its money where 
its “civilizing” mouth is. 
As argued above, civilian power requires “efforts at constraining the use of force in set-
tling political conflicts, both within and between states” as well as the “promotion of 
non-violent forms of conflict management and conflict resolution” (Harnisch/Maull 
2001b: 4). The emerging conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict 
peace-building roles of the EU that includes robust peacekeeping are consistent with 
these criteria. First, EU operations since 2003 have proven that the EU is willing and 
capable of reacting to ongoing and emerging humanitarian and security crises, by us-
ing both military and civilian instruments of crisis management. While the immediate 
goal is the provision of security and stability, all EU missions have been linked to the 
long-term goal of state-building and democracy promotion that require civilian rather 
than military measures. Thus, the ESS puts strong emphasis on security sector reform 
as an important condition for successful state-building and democratic transformation 
(cf. Osland 2004). A major focus is the (democratic) control of those actors who com-
mand executive and coercive power. This is why all EU missions have made training 
and monitoring police forces a major if not the exclusive priority. All military operations 
have been complemented or followed-up by so called civilian EUPOL missions for the 
building and reforming of police institutions.  
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 While EU missions in the framework of ESDP focus on security issues, they are em-
bedded in civilian measures aiming at the economic and political development of the 
target state. In case of Macedonia, for instance, the military operation was not only 
followed by a police mission; it was also backed up by substantial financial assistance 
from the CARDS17 institutional reform and emergency assistance programmes, e.g. for 
the drafting of a law on local self-government that formed another key element of the 
Ohrid Agreement. Moreover, the perspective of a Stabilization and Association Agree-
ment with the EU provided a main incentive for the Macedonian government to move 
forward the implementation of the law. 
Second, all EU missions have been firmly embedded in a multilateral framework. They 
were either requested or at least endorsed by the UN and – with the exception of Arte-
mis in Congo – supported by NATO assets. The EU explicitly recognizes the UN Secu-
rity Council as primary responsible for the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity (see Dembinski/Brock 2004). In their Joint Declaration on EU-UN Cooperation in 
Crisis Management, the two organizations committed themselves to establishing a joint 
consultative mechanism (Steering Committee) to examine ways of enhancing mutual 
cooperation in planning, training, communication and the exchange of best practice. 
The two organizations agreed to develop mutually reinforcing approaches to conflict 
prevention and to ensure that the EU’s evolving military and civilian capacities would 
provide real added value for UN crisis management. EUPOL Kinshasa served as a first 
test operation demonstrating that the EU can contribute effectively to UN peace-
keeping operations.  
Against initial worries, the capacity of the EU for autonomous operations under ESPD 
has not distracted European contributions to UN peacekeeping. While EU member 
states are very reluctant to place their troops under UN command,18 they contribute 
39% of the UN peacekeeping budget (compared to 22% of the US) and 36,8% of the 
regular budget (compared to 27% of the US, cf. Tardy 2005: 51). Moreover, the general 
absence of EU states from UN-led operations has to be checked against their presence 
in UN-mandated operations. The EU does not consider a UN mandate necessary for 
operations that are deployed in Europe, with the consent of the host state, and of non-
coercive nature. But the UN has usually endorsed EU missions and the two organiza-
                                                
17  In 2002, the EU gave € 63,5 million in aid to Macedonia (cf. Mace 2003: 479). 
18  EU member states only account for 6,52 % of UN troops (cf. Tardy 2005: 52). Moreover, EU member 
states have dismissed the request of the UN to “re-hat” some of their assets when handing responsibili-
ties over to the UN, e.g. after the departure of ARTEMIS from Congo. 
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 tions have closely cooperated in case of a UN involvement. The EU has proven itself 
as a reliable “burden-sharing” partner, particularly in areas where the UN is the weak-
est: rapid reaction to humanitarian crisis, on the one hand, and sustainable post-conflict 
management, on the other (cf. Novosseloff 2004; Tardy 2005). The EU-UN cooperation 
in the field of military and civilian crisis management has developed faster and deeper 
compared to any other regional organization, such as NATO. Many see it as a model 
for the cooperation between the UN and the African Union, for example (cf. Tardy 
2005).  
The EU also cooperates with other international and regional organizations, such as 
the OSCE in the Western Balkans (Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) and the pe-
riphery of Russia (Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldava), the African Union (Sudan), and 
ASEAN (Aceh/Indonesia). The cooperation with NATO is of particular relevance. The 
Berlin Plus Agreement provides a framework for the coordination of military action.19 It 
is a series of arrangements for EU access to NATO assets and capabilities. The coop-
eration with NATO has not only enhanced the still weak military operational capabilities 
of the EU. It has also prevented a rift with the U.S. and its major European allies, nota-
bly the UK and Turkey, which do not want ESDP to become a rival to NATO and trans-
atlantic military cooperation with the U.S. However, relations between NATO and the 
EU are still sensitive. There is a serious lack of coordination on the ground, e.g. in 
places such as Afghanistan. This has led to quite some concern about the prioritization 
between military and political means in the reconstruction effort which has only recently 
been clarified. 
In general, however, the EU’s increasing role in inter- and intra-national conflict resolu-
tion and peace-building is fully consistent with the foreign policy of a “civilian power” as 
identified above. The EU eschews purely military security concerns in favour of security 
sector reform. In order to induce compliance with its security policies, the EU relies on 
capacity-building and positive conditionality rather than sanctions and coercive power. 
While the EU does not preclude the use of military force, military operations are inte-
grated in the overall framework of crisis management that combines the use of finan-
cial, civilian and military instruments.  
                                                
19  Berlin Plus builds on the arrangements concluded in Berlin in June 1996, which served as a basis for 
cooperation between the West European Union (WEU) and NATO (cf. Haine 2004). It includes four 
major elements: assured access to NATO planning; presumption of availability of pre-identified NATO 
common assets and capabilities; European command options including the role of the NATO Deputy 
Supreme Allied Commander Allied Forces, Europe; and a NATO-EU Security Information Agreement. 
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 5.  Conclusions: An Emerging Civilian World Power 
 
We have argued in this paper that the EU’s role in the promotion of democracy, human 
rights, and the rule of law as well as its engagement in conflict prevention, crisis man-
agement, and post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction is fully consistent with a 
foreign policy identity of a “civilian power” that emphasizes peaceful means of conflict 
resolution, principled, but effective multilateralism, as well as the legalization and de-
mocratization of world affairs. In fact and contrary to some arguments in the literature, 
we would argue that the EU has assumed the role of a civilian power only recently and 
after the end of the Cold War. “Civilian power” requires pro-active foreign policies and it 
necessitates that a polity has the whole range of political, economic, cultural, and mili-
tary instruments at its disposal. If we use this yardstick, one could argue that the EU 
only became a “civilian power” at about 2000. By that time, the various strategies and 
instruments for the promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, had 
been integrated into a common framework. Moreover, only around the turn of the cen-
tury was the EU capable to assume an active role in peacekeeping through the gradual 
buildup of the ESDP. The European Security Strategy (ESS) was then the first attempt 
at formulating a comprehensive foreign policy strategy.  
Since the early 1990s, the EU has tried to systematically incorporate the promotion of a 
specific set of European values into its external relations. In this regard, the EU is sur-
prisingly explicit about projecting a particular identity distinguishing itself from the US, 
particularly with regard to principled, but effective multilateralism. It is the combination 
of civilian and military resources to manage violent conflict where the EU sees its main 
contribution to international security. 
Yet, the civilian power EU still faces two major obstacles in becoming an effective and 
coherent actor regarding crisis management and conflict resolution: intergovernmental 
decision-making in ESDP, on the one hand, and the separation of military and civilian 
crisis management operations in the second (ESDP/CFSP) and third pillars (JHA) from 
programmes managed by the European Commission in the first pillar (humanitarian 
and development aid, trade policy, environmental and social policy), on the other (cf. 
Gourlay 2004). These two factors also hamper the capacity of the EU to implement the 
integrated and comprehensive approach aspired by the European Security Strategy. 
Yet, one should not overlook that the intergovernmental nature of ESDP and the EU’s 
complex and cross-pillarized decision-making structure might have some beneficial 
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 elements: It institutionally prevents the militarization of EU foreign policy and the emer-
gence of a European “supranational security state.” 
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